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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

HANS JURGEN DROBEL,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890472-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of three counts of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1978) (amended 1989).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that defendant

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived counsel and
therefore would be allowed to proceed pro se?

On appeal, a

defendant, who expressly declines an offer of counsel by the
trial court, has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance
of the evidence that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive the right to counsel.
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987).

State v. Frampton, 737

An appellate court will reverse the

trial court's ruling on a defendant's request to proceed pro se

only when that ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.

See,

e.g., People v. Manaqo, 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 269 Cal.Rptr. 819,
823 (1990); State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383 (1983)
(en banc), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
2.

Did the trial court violate defendant's

constitutional rights by not allowing him to prepare for trial?
This issue presents a question of law which is subject to a
"correction of error" standard of review.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct.
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456
(Utah 1989) .
3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant

defendant credit for time served in pretrial incarceration when
it sentenced him on the aggravated robbery convictions?

Because

this also presents a question of law, the "correction of error"
standard of review applies.

Christensen, 788 P.2d at 516;

Willden, 768 P.2d at 456.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August 1986, defendant, Hans Jurgen Drobel, was
charged with four counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1986) (amended

o

1989) . On February 6, 1987, after a competency evaluation of
defendant was performed, the trial court ruled that he was not
competent to stand trial and ordered that he be committed to the
Utah State Hospital until such time as he was competent to
proceed (Record Volume identified as Dist. Ct. No. 861912521 as
o

part of CR89-89, at 29-30) . On March 16, 1988, the trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice the
charges against defendant, so that a civil commitment of
3
defendant could be pursued (^d. at 34; R. 133 at 2-3; R. 17) .
On May 11, 1988, the State, having failed to obtain a
civil commitment of defendant, refiled aggravated Jobbery charges
(three counts) against defendant (R. 7-8). On October 21, 1988,
the trial court, after a hearing, ruled that defendant was
competent to stand trial (R. 133 at 40). On January 27, 1989, at
his arraignment hearing in district court, defendant requested
that he be allowed to represent himself (R. 137 at 6). After
hearing from defendant, defendant's counsel, and the prosecutor,
the court denied that request (^d. at 24). However, after a
subsequent hearing on February 3, 1989, the court granted

There are five separate record volumes in the record on appeal.
The original informations charging defendant with the four counts
of aggravated robbery are contained in the four record volumes
identified by Dist Ct. No. CR89-89. A fifth record volume
identified by Dist. Ct. No. 891900089 contains the information
that charges the three counts of aggravated robbery of which
defendant was convicted. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to "R." in this brief are to the latter record volume.
2
All other record volumes, except that which is cited to as f,R.H
in this brief, contain a copy of the court's order.
3
The transcripts of the proceedings in this case are marked with
a record number and therefore will be referred to as "R. 133,"
"R. 132," etc.

defendant's request to proceed pro se and ordered that
defendant's counsel up to that point remain as standby counsel
(R. 130 at 13, 18).
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as
charged (R. 99-101).

The court sentenced defendant to

consecutive five years to life terms at the Utah State Prison on
all three counts (R. 106).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, the facts of defendant's
crimes need not be recited.

Facts related to the specific issues

raised by defendant on appeal will be set forth in.the argument
portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his right to counsel.

The trial court's on-

the-record colloquy with defendant concerning the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation demonstrated that defendant
understood what he was doing.

Furthermore, although perhaps a

somewhat close question, defendant does not demonstrate that his
history of mental illness precluded him from competently waiving
counsel.
Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court
violated his constitutional rights by refusing to permit him to
adequately prepare for trial.

Defendant's allegations in this

regard are conclusory and appear to be premised on an incorrect
view of what resources are available to an incarcerated defendant
who elects to proceed pro se.
-4-

Defendant's request for credit for time spent in
pretrial incarceration was improperly presented to the trial
court•

That request must be directed to the Board of Pardons.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed

reversible error in allowing him to represent himself because the
court failed to make a sufficient inquiry into whether defendant
was competent to waive his right to counsel and invoke his right
to self-representation, and further should have overturned sua
sponte its ruling once defendant had demonstrated his inability
"to adequately represent himself and understand what that selfrepresentation required in connection with procedure in [c]ourt."
Br. of Appellant at 16-17.

In short, he claims that he did not

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to
counsel.
A defendant in a state criminal trial has a fundamental
constitutional right of self-representation and may defend
himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974);

State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987).

"It has long

been settled that the right to the assistance of counsel is
personal in nature and may be waived by a competent accused if
the waiver is 'knowingly and intelligently' made[;] [s]uch waiver
must of course be voluntary."

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187

(footnote citations omitted).

It is the trial court's duty to

determine whether the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made.

Ibid.

In determining the validity of a

waiver, the trial court must make the defendant "aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.'"

Ibid, (quoting Faretta, 422

U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942)).

This information is best obtained through "a

colloquy on the record between the court and the accused" which
includes "penetrating questioning" by the court.

Ibid.

In this appeal, defendant, who expressly declined an
offer of counsel by the trial court, has the burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to
counsel.

Ibid.

"Whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has

been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding each case."

Ld. at 188 (footnote citations omitted).

Although no Utah appellate court decision has expressly stated
so, it is generally recognized that a trial court's ruling on a
defendant's request to proceed pro se will not be reversed unless
that ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.

See, e.g.,

People v. Manaqo, 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 269 Cal.Rptr. 819, 823
(1990) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to proceed pro se); Halbert v. State, 735 P.2d
565, 566 (Okl. Cr. 1987) (abuse of discretion standard applied);
State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383, 391 (1983) (en
banc) (same), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
-G-

Defendant first moved to represent himself at his
arraignment in the district court. Although he indicated that he
was satisfied "so far" with his counsel, Manny Garcia, he wished
to represent himself (R. 137 at 3, 6-8). As defendant fully
discusses in his brief, the court, after questioning defendant on
his request and considering the concerns of both defense counsel
and the prosecutor that defendant was not competent to represent
himself due to a perceived mental disorder, denied defendant's
request for self-representation (R. 137 at 24).

It stated:

Based upon the court's grave concerns as to
the magnitude of the offenses that are
charged against you, Mr. Drobel, and based
upon the representation of your attorney, Mr.
Garcia, and the concern of the State and the
apparent lengthy history of mental concerns
that have been expressed to the court today
and are partially contained in the file, the
court finds that it is not in your best
interests to have you represent yourself and
denies your motion and request to represent
yourself.
(R. 137 at 24).

However, in a subsequent hearing one week later,

the court again considered defendant's request that he be allowed
to represent himself.

The following colloquy between the court

and defendant occurred:
The Court: Mr. Drobel, the court has placed
this matter on the court's calendar for the
opportunity to review and, perhaps,
reconsider the question of your request
previously to represent yourself before this
court in trial. Is it still your desire to
represent yourself?
Defendant:

It is, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you understand that the
Constitution does protect your right to do
that[;] however, the court does not recommend
that?

Defendant:

I understand that, yes.

The Court: Do you also understand that there
are certain dangers that are incorporated by
representing yourself before this court in a
trial and this is anticipated, as I recall,
to be a jury trial.
Is that correct Mr. Garcia?
Mr. Garcia:

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: There are dangers and risks that
can occur by doing that. Do you understand
that?
Defendant:

I understand your point.

The Court: Do you understand that you are
charged with three first-degree felonies,
each being armed robberies, as I recall the
counts of the information?
Defendant:

I acknowledge that, yeah.

The Court: And do you also understand a
first-degree felony may result, if you are
convicted, in a penalty of five to life at
the Utah State Prison on each offense and
that the penalty may be imposed to run
consecutively or concurrently and you may be
thus housed in the Utah State Prison?
Defendant:

I heard about that.

The Court: You don't have any questions
about that, do you?
Defendant:

No question, no.

The Court: You've read the information that
has been alleged against you, that is the
document on which the charges are contained,
and you understand that's the penalty that
could be imposed upon you if you are
convicted?
Defendant:

I understand that.

The Court: Now, Mr. Drobel, there has been a
history of questionable mental health. You
understand that your attorney, Mr. Garcia,
desires to raise the defense to this action
of diminished capacity mentally ill. You
also understand that since these offenses

occurred, as I recall—I don't have the
specific date but they are 1985 offenses—
Mr. Garcia:

'86, I believe.

The Court: '86 offenses. That for a period
of time thereafter you were housed at the
Utah State Hospital with physicians having
determined that at the beginning of that
period of time you were incompetent to
continue in assisting in the defense of your
matter and that you were not competent to
stand trial. Do you understand that?
Defendant:

So far.

The Court: Do you understand that after you
had been retained in the Utah State Hospital
for a period of approximately a year those
same physicians determined that your mental
health was likely malingering or a result of
your desire to continue it, in that respect,
and they determined that you were thus no
longer in need of protection for mental
health difficulties.
Defendant:

I read the report, yes.

The Court: All right. You don't have any
trouble understanding that report?
Defendant:

No problems.

The Court: And you obviously disagree with
the earlier statement that you had mental
difficulties and now you certainly do not
claim that you have continuing mental defects
or difficulty; is that correct?
Defendant: I have never said that I was
mentally ill.
The Court: And you don't claim that now, do
you?
Defendant:

Claim to be mentally ill?

The Court: Yes.
Defendant:

I don't claim to be mentally ill.

The Court: You claim, in fact, to be not
mentally ill, don't you?

Defendant: Correct.
The Court: You understand that if the court
allows you to defend yourself that your
defense that Mr. Garcia recommends will not
be raised, that is, he wanted to defend on
the basis that you do have mental difficulty
and diminished capacity but you feel that's
not appropriate to present to the jury?
Defendant:

Would you say that again.

The Court: Sure. Mr. Garcia believes the
defense, among others that should be raised
to the jury, is that you do have mental
difficulty.
Defendant:

Oh, yeah, he told me so, yeah.

The Court: All right. You do not believe
you do and you do not desire that defense to
be presented; is that correct?
Defendant:

That's correct.

The Court: You understand then that if the
case is tried to the jury with you
representing yourself and defending yourself
that that defense will not be presented?
That mental difficulty?
Defendant: If I defend myself that
recommendation of Mr. Garcia's will not be
used. That's correct.
The Court:

You understand that.

Defendant:

I do understand that, yes.

The Court: Now, you understand also—you
indicated to the court last week when you
were here that there were certain, if I
recall the word, "creative defenses" that you
think you could raise to the jury that Mr.
Garcia would not raise to the jury because
he's a lawyer trained in the law and you were
a businessman. Is that correct?
Defendant:

That is not correct.

The Court: All right. Tell me what you
anticipate raising—you don't need to
disclose to me your defenses, but your desire
is to defend your case yourself in this case
-i n_

without Mr. Garcia except as he may sit at
counsel table and give you advice; is that
correct?
Defendant:

So far that's correct.

The Court: Well, do you anticipate changing
your mind?
Defendant: Oh, no, but I agree to what you
said, Your Honor, that I'm not going to
disclose at this time the strategy of my
defense.
The Court:

I'm not asking you to.

Defendant: Yeah. Neither did I use, as far
as I remember, that quotation, "creative
defense." I think I—I don't think I used
that word.
The Court:

What did you use, if you recall?

Defendant: I didn't use any word regarding
my defense. I just was stating that—excuse
me for repeating this—lawyers sometimes lack
imagination in their defense.
The Court: All right. So that "imagination"
maybe was the adjective that you used last
week. And their lack of imagination you
believe you can defend your case better with
your imagination, right [sic]?
Defendant: Imagination alone doesn't do it.
Experience and knowledge and assistance from
as many sides as possible combined will do
it.
The Court: And you believe you can defend
yourself with those combined skills?
Defendant:

Oh, yes, definitely.

The Court:

Tell me what your education is.

Defendant:

I told you last time.

The Court: I know you said 24 years.
you to tell me again.
Defendant:

What do you want to hear?

I want

The Court: All right. What education have
you had?
Defendant:

What kind of?

The Court:

Just describe your education.

Defendant: I was trained mainly in business
and that included advertisement—what's the
word in English?
The Court:
schooling?

Have you had years of formal

Defendant;

Yes, I have.

The CourtJ

How many of those.

Defendant!

22.

The Court:

Last week you said 24.

Defendant: I said 24f
in addition which were
university but with an
would call it here . .
college.

yeah. I had two years
not done by a public
institute. I think I
. some sort of

The CourtJ

Continuing education?

Defendant:

No.

The CourtJ

All right.

Correspondent college.

Defendant: Well, in Germany correspondent
colleges are accepted as well as university
so, therefore, I said last time 24 but I
heard this is maybe different here in the
United States.
The Court: All right. Your native tongue is
German; is that correct?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: But it's obvious to the court
that you speak fluent English. Do you feel
that you have any language difficencies [sic]
in understanding English and in defending
yourself in English?
Defendant: Yes, I have. I would ask at the
proper time to provide me with a couple of
translators.
-1 0_

The Court:
had?

What English training have you

Defendant: In Germany it is the law to learn
English in school but that is just merely
some English, what we call school English,
and that is based on the British language,
but then I have contact with Americans we
have doing business in Europe. And then I
came over here seven years ago and I learned,
of course, by experience, being in the
country more. But still I feel that I lack
many, you know, terms, especially in the
court. I have to learn about them and for
this this is one of the reasons I would like
to have an attorney on my side that would
stand by—
The Court: All right. Do you understand
that there are dangers in defending yourself?
Defendant:

You said so, yeah.

The Court: Do you understand that the rules
of evidence involve training that you may not
have?
Defendant: A possibility but that's not—
that is not necessarily true or a fact.
The Court: All right. Do you understand
that you have the right to be confronted by
witnesses and the trial procedure would be
the State would call witnesses to testify
against you and you would have the
opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses?
Defendant:

I understand that, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you understand that normal
legal objections such as objections to
relevance, objections if the hearsay rules
are deemed being violated, objections if the
nature of the questioning is argumentative
and other such legal objections would be
raised by the State during the course of the
trial and the court would have to rule on
those as matters of law? Do you understand
that?
Defendant: Yeah, I understand that and I'm
prepared by that.

The Court: And you are prepared to raise
those objections, you believe?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand that you may
compel witnesses to testify on your own
behalf and that you have indicated to this
court that you believe some approximate [sic]
22 witnesses should be called to testify but
that this court would be obligated to rule on
whether those witness's [sic] testimony would
be relevant to the case? Do you understand
that?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: And that you don't just call
witnesses just to testify to your character
and credibility, you call witnesses to
testify to facts that they are aware of in
relation to the offense. Do you understand
that?
Defendant:

Yes.

Yes, I do.

The Court: Is anyone putting any pressure or
undue influence on you for the purpose of
having you request this representation by
yourself?
Defendant:

No, sir.

The Court:
act?

You are doing this as a voluntary

Defendant:

I do.

(R. 130 at 3-12).

The court then granted defendant's request for

self-representation and ordered that Mr. Garcia remain on the
4
case as standby counsel (Id. at 13, 18).
4
Although defendant suggests that he did not trust Mr. Garcia to
assist him as standby counsel and thus the trial court erred in
retaining him as such, Br. of Appellant at 16 n.16, he clearly
had no objection to Garcia remaining and, in fact, appeared to
desire very much Garcia's assistance in preparing for trial. In
discussing with the court a possible continuance of the trial
date to allow defendant more time to prepare, defendant said:
Yes, I think [a February 23] trial date

Although the court's inquiry regarding selfrepresentation did not precisely follow that suggested by the
Utah Supreme Court in Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12, it
satisfied the general requirement that the trial court Minsure[]
that [a] defendantf] understand[s] the risks of selfrepresentation, " id. at 187. The colloquy between the court and
defendant

demonstrates that defendant "'understood the relative

advantages and disadvantages of self-representation[,] . . .
understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible
maximum penaltyf,] . . . [and] was aware of the existence of
technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a
matter of telling one's story. '"

Ijd. at 188 (quoting City of

Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wash.2d 203, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en
banc)).

Additionally, the court made clear to defendant that it

did not recommend self-representation.

See State v. Ruple, 631

P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1981) (trial court failed to advise the
defendant that "it is generally advisable to have a lawyer who is
skilled and trained in law").
Defendant argues that the court's inquiry was
inadequate because it did not sufficiently explore defendant's
mental problems and their effect on his ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive counsel.

Specifically, he claims that

nothing in the record indicates the competency file offered by
4
Cont. could be done depending on Mr.
Garcia's calendar because I think I would
like to take quite a bit of time from him and
so maybe we should ask him how much time he's
able to spend with me or my case.
(R. 130 at 16).

Mr. Garcia at the arraignment hearing was "formally or
informally" reviewed by the court, and that the court should have
ordered the scheduled examination of defendant for a possible
diminished capacity defense even though defendant had indicated
he did not want to pursue that defense.

In short, defendant

asserts that the court, in granting his request to proceed pro se
at the February 3 hearing, effectively ignored his history of
mental illness and the prior representations of counsel and the
doctors on that subject.

However, the record simply does not

support such a conclusion.
At defendant's arraignment hearing on January 27, Mr.
Garcia presented to the court a detailed summary of the history
of defendant's case and the diagnoses of the doctors who had
examined defendant and concluded that he was mentally ill (R. 137
at 11-14).

Mr. Garcia forcefully argued that, based on the

doctors' conclusions, defendant should not be allowed to
represent himself (R. 137 at 14-15).

The court obviously

considered all of this when, at the end of that hearing, it
denied defendant's request to proceed pro se. Although the court
subsequently granted the request at the February 3 hearing,
defendant cannot fairly state that the court had not considered
defendant's history of mental illness and the representations of
the doctors and counsel.

Indeed, during its questioning of

defendant at that hearing, the court specifically discussed with
defendant his history of mental illness and his desire to forgo a
diminished capacity defense (R. 130 at 4-7). In sum, while
defendant may now disagree with the court's ruling on self-
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representation, the court clearly considered defendant's mental
5
condition before making that ruling .
A more difficult question is presented as to whether
defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that, under the particular circumstances of his case, he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.

This he

must do to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing him to proceed pro se.
While defendant was found competent to stand trial,
that finding alone did not automatically enable him to waive the
constitutional right to counsel and to conduct his own defense.
State v. Laffertyf 749 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1988).

However, as

acknowledged by defendant, the "standard of competence for making
the decision to represent oneself is vaguely higher than the
standard for competence to stand trial."

United States ex rel.

Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976).

See also Commonwealth v.

Wertheimer, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 930, 472 N.E.2d 266, 268 (1984)
(collecting cases).

"Accordingly, trial courts hesitate to deny

the request [for self-representation] of an adult defendant
unless he appears to be suffering from some significant mental

Defendant does not explain how the scheduled examination of
defendant for the possible diminished capacity defense would have
added any useful information to the record regarding defendant's
mental condition. That defendant suffered from a mental disorder
generally described by the doctors as a "delusional disorder of
the grandiose type" (R. 133 at 9; R. 136 — Letters of Breck
Lebegue, M.D. (dated Dec. 1, 1988) and of Van 0. Austin and
Robert J. Howell, M.D. (dated Sept. 20, 1988)), was well
documented and fully presented to the court by defendant's
counsel at the arraignment hearing (R. 137 at 12-14).

disability.

Where the record suggests such a possibility and the

trial court made an appropriate inquiry, its determination that a
defendant was competent, notwithstanding some history of mental
illness, is likely to be sustained on appeal.

The trial judge .

. . is 'in the best position to observe the defendant, his
conduct and his demeanor.'"

LaFave and Israel, Criminal

Procedure § 11.5(d) at 48-49 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court was presented with
a difficult situation.

Defendant, who clearly had a history of

mental illness, insisted upon representing himself.

When the

court discussed the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation with him, defendant appeared to understand what he
was doing.

The court thoroughly questioned defendant about his

education, which was fairly extensive. Although the court may
have validly refused to allow defendant to proceed pro se under
the circumstances, its decision to permit him to represent
himself was not an abuse of discretion.

See People v. Clark, 50

Cal.3d 583, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, 149-50 (1990) (trial
court did not err in ruling that the defendant was competent to
represent himself at penalty phase of capital case, even though
defendant had history of mental illness and had engaged in selfdestructive behavior); State v. Harding, 670 P.2d at 391 (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant
was mentally competent to waive counsel where in making its
determination, the court considered psychiatrists' opinions and
also observed defendant's demeanor and heard responses to
inquiries about procedural matters posed by court, and where
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record reflected that defendant was articulate and forcefully
expressed his desire to represent himself).

Based on the entire

record, and particularly the on-the-record discussion between the
court and defendant, the court was well within its discretion in
concluding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived counsel.

"[M]ere diagnosis of a mental

disease or disorder does not mean that the defendant is unable to
make rational decisions regarding his case."
at 391 (citations omitted).

Harding, 670 P.2d

And, this is not a case where the

trial court failed to adequately advise the defendant of the
dangers of self-representation, see Ruple, 631 P.2d at 876, or
where the defendant did not clearly assert his right to selfrepresentation, see Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1248.
Finally, that defendant did not make certain motions
(e.g., motion to sever, motion to suppress ), filed a motion to
dismiss which lacked legal merit, and conducted a quiet defense
which did not include a diminished capacity defense, did not
require the court to reverse sua sponte its ruling that defendant
could proceed pro se. A defendant is not bound by the
recommendations of counsel as to particular defenses, and may
make decisions that are detrimental to his case.

Lafferty, 749

P.2d at 1249. Additionally, defendant, who chose to proceed pro
se, may not allege on appeal that he did not adequately represent
himself by failing to file certain motions, etc.

See Frampton,

737 P.2d at 189.

Defendant does not claim that he would have prevailed on any of
these motions.

POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY
REFUSING TO PERMIT HIM TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE
FOR TRIAL.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his
constitutional rights because it did not allow him to adequately
prepare for trial.

Specifically, he claims, as he did in his

motion to dismiss (R. 60), that he was denied access to an
adequate law library, was not allowed to use effectively the
telephone, and did not have adequate contact with standby counsel
or the prosecutor.

As in his motion to dismiss, these

allegations are presented in conclusory fashion without any
description of what information he was denied that he needed for
trial preparation.

Furthermore, defendant never requested

additional time to prepare for trial and did not seek any
specific remedies (other than dismissal) for the alleged
problems.

Although defendant claims to have had inadequate

contact with standby counsel, his motion to dismiss plainly
indicates that Mr. Garcia was available to help him and to
provide necessary case law to the court (R. 60-61).

Thus, this

case is distinguishable from Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443 (9th
Cir. 1985), which is relied on by defendant.

Indeed, the better

view is that a defendant who voluntarily waives his right to
counsel is not entitled to access to a law library, so long as he
is afforded some alternative means for assistance in the
preparation of his defense, such as standby counsel. United
States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct.
521 (1990); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226

(7th Cir. 1983); LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(e) at
51 (1984) ("While the pro se defendant who is incarcerated may
have a right of access to legal materials (within limits), he
will not be heard to complain on appeal that his ignorance of
various procedural requirements should be excused because the
prison's law library was inadequate (particularly where standby
7
counsel was available).").
In sum, defendant simply has not demonstrated that the
trial court restricted his efforts to prepare for trial.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT CREDIT FOR PRETRIAL INCARCERATION.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his
right to equal protection by not granting him credit toward his
prison sentence for the time he spent at the Utah State Prison.
This argument is without merit.

The Utah Supreme Court has made

clear that, in felony cases where an indeterminate sentence is
imposed, the trial court does not have authority to grant credit
for pretrial incarceration; that request must be directed to the
Board of Pardons.

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 276-77

(Utah 1985).

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not
appointing an interpreter. Although defendant did request an
interpreter and the court did not rule on that request, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that he did not fully
understand the proceedings and what was being said. While he
indicated that he did not understand some legal terms, defendant
appeared to understand the English language very well. In fact,
at one point, the court commented, "[I]t's obvious to the court
that you speak fluent English" (R. 130 at 10).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
convictions and sentences should be affirmed.
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